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Author: TK Pooe, who is a public policy specialist at the Wits School of Governance. He writes in his personal capacity.
Setting or un-setting the scene
As the famous football commentator Fabrizio Romano likes to say, “Here we go.” South Africa finally has a General Election result that shows the party of President Nelson Mandela and President Thabo Mbeki deep under, not only at 45%, but barely hanging on to 40%. Only a few predicted it. Individuals such as Dr. Frans Cronje deserve credit for foreseeing this outcome. On the one hand, we should be pleased to witness this bad electoral performance, and this should serve as a lesson to any administration to be established in the following weeks. However, it appears that this punishment was intended not only for the African National Congress (ANC), but also for other traditional opposition parties such as the Democratic Alliance (DA), Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), Freedom Front Plus, and, to a lesser extent, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), which, while not able to govern KwaZulu-Natal outright, have experienced commendable growth, as has the major winner of this election, uMkhonto weSizwe (MK Party).
Millions, if not billions, of rand have been spent on shining manifestos, thousands of kilometers have been driven by party vehicles, dancers and singers have been hired, meals have been distributed, and the services of polished consultants have been employed, all to arrive at this point, where we appear to be still living in the era of President Jacob Gedleyihlekisa Zuma. The spirit of which could be encapsulated in a phrase by the protagonist Thanos from Endgame (a fantastic film): “Dread it.” Run away from it. Destiny arrives all the same. And now it’s arrived. Or should I say, “I am”? However, it is vital to note that destiny is created by leadership, thus this essay will explore through scenario setting and application what July 2024 may contain for us people.
Tools of analysis and Contexualisation
Perhaps a good way to think about what just happened is to apply the famous Chinese Communist Party (CCP) maxim, first attributed to Chen Yun at the State Council of the Central People’s Government in 1950 but more famously associated with Deng Xiaoping, which states that we must “cross the river by feeling for the stones.” In this regard, and in an attempt to make sense of what might happen after the composition of the seventh administration, I would want to feel the river by presenting some feasible, probable, likely, and genuinely unfathomable situations for us to consider. However, before doing so, it is necessary to establish the South African and global background for the incoming new government by conducting a short environmental scanning exercise.
2. Social: Two important factors stand out: the school system needs a significant makeover. Having excellent colleges and top-notch pre-university schools for a select few while the bulk is left out is absurd. The solution lies not in spreading this excellence but in figuring out how to duplicate it and make it available to more people. Secondly, there is a curse of regional disparity that needs to be lifted. Rural and township areas could emerge as new hubs for innovation and a rise in residential real estate. Realizing this promise must be the top priority for the incoming administration. The greatest risk in this situation is to ignore both of these social groups and then watch as a new generation of messiahs uses them as springboards for justifiable uprisings.
3. Technological: Any new plans or policies for economic development must properly evaluate the extent to which technology will be integrated and the practicality of its benefits for a state and region such as South Africa.
4. Environmental: These days, the Just Energy Transition (JET) and its implications are the main topic of discussion. Although the shift to JET is unavoidable, how to manage it without disregarding the present economic realities is a contentious issue for a state like South Africa. It would be foolish to just exclude the State’s known fossil fuel resources from the planning process in favor of unaffordable and uncompetitive Global North loans.
5. Legal: the elections have illustrated that new thinking is needed about the Constitution’s overly liberal values as it relates to illegal migrations, interference in people’s private lives and the like. There is a need to consider how to reimagine the post-1994 Constitution, as voters have shown by propping up parties like the Patriotic Alliance, ActionSA, ACDP and the like.
The environmental scanning activity mentioned above helped create the framework for the five scenarios that follow. It’s crucial to remember that scenarios are instruments for attempting to predict what could (different) happen tomorrow as all the political parties strive for the elusive 201 seats needed to establish a new parliament rather than predictions.
With much pomp, this shotgun marriage—which was not motivated by love but rather by the financial and political elites of both parties—is proclaimed. The first few months are difficult since it is expected that the current president, Cyril Ramaphosa, stay in order to complete this partnership. The main policy concerns shared by both parties tend to center on efficiency and the workings of government rather than being explicitly addressed. Gains for both parties include the DA’s increased policy leeway with relation to the extension of provincial governments’ scheduling powers in the areas of security and transportation. The ANC’s more capital-loathing members are prepared to give up the SACP and COSATU as alliance partners in order to eliminate more “radical” forces inside the party by bringing in the DA. Gauteng also forms an experimental, flexible coalition.
The MK party of President Zuma agrees and forms an informal coalition with the ANC, with President Ramaphosa’s departure serving as the catalyst or offering. This opens the door for Paul Mashatile, the deputy president, or a compromise candidate to emerge and collaborate with the MK party. Though they see this alliance as a haphazard and loose arrangement, the MK party forms a provincial partnership with the IFP in KwaZulu-Natal in order to have some degree of protection against the ANC. In the weeks that follow, both parties launch a charm offensive to reassure the corporate sector—both domestically and globally—that no drastic or disturbing reforms will be implemented. Fixing the sorry status of the KZN economy, with a particular emphasis on ports and rails, is one of their top goals. They also want to address the issue with the Zulu Royal House and tailor their policy offerings to the needs of South Africa’s townships and rural areas. Gauteng is involved with another party as well.
In this scenario, the EFF and ANC demand that President Ramaphosa remain in office, but in order to have some political insurance, the MK persuades the IFP to into a provincial alliance against their will. Nonetheless, this alliance demands that President Ramaphosa maintain the functioning of the private sector in order to introduce a number of robust policies that might potentially undermine the dominance of the markets. Many Western nations express their disapproval in public or privately, but the BRICS+ alliance sees this as a chance to increase investment in South Africa. In the end, this scenario shows this grouping eager to tackle significant policy obstacles and issues in order to win over Western economies and project a picture of working for the South Africans who rejected majority government by all three parties. Gauteng takes on the role of a makeweight in the finance ministry to placate the EFF.
All of the aforementioned parties join forces to form a grand alliance with the goal of unseat the ANC and negating its 159 seats, should the improbable happen that the voters and supporters of each opposition party send a message to their respective parties demanding a post-ANC administration in the near future. Like many of the Gauteng municipalities that formed coalitions after the 2016 Local Government Elections, this grand coalition also seeks to ensure that the ANC loses all power. By allowing themselves to be led by a non-politician, they repress their innate desire to be the main figure, whether it be a woman or a man. Their immediate offerings center on two main issues: historical corruption cases and economic revitalization.
Under this deal, the ANC is allowed to retain President Ramaphosa as the head of state, with the FF+ joining later on a provisional basis. Initially, all three parties agreed to this. John Steenhuisen of the DA, however, is appointed Deputy President. The proviso states that one of the three opposition parties, most likely the DA considering the Ministry of Finance’s position, will receive other important cabinet positions awarded to the IFP and FF+. As elections approach, this formation after 2029 eventually stands alone. This echoes the remarks made by the late President De Klerk.
Conclusion
The scenarios that are provided here may be completely erroneous and impractical, but at least they let you, the reader, think through the various outcomes that could occur. I don’t really have a preference; instead, I just want to see which option comes closest to our post-June 2024 reality.